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Abstract
The k-anonymity privacy requirement for publishing mi-
crodata requires that each equivalence class (i.e., a set of
records that are indistinguishable from each other with re-
spect to certain “identifying” attributes) contains at least
k records. Recently, several authors have recognized that
k-anonymity cannot prevent attribute disclosure. The no-
tion of `-diversity has been proposed to address this; `-
diversity requires that each equivalence class has at least
` well-represented values for each sensitive attribute.
In this paper we show that `-diversity has a number of
limitations. In particular, it is neither necessary nor suf-
ﬁcient to prevent attribute disclosure. We propose a novel
privacy notion called t-closeness, which requires that the
distribution of a sensitive attribute in any equivalence class
is close to the distribution of the attribute in the overall ta-
ble (i.e., the distance between the two distributions should
be no more than a threshold t). We choose to use the Earth
Mover Distance measure for our t-closeness requirement.
We discuss the rationale for t-closeness and illustrate its
advantages through examples and experiments.
1. Introduction
Agencies and other organizations often need to publish
microdata, e.g., medical data or census data, for research
and other purposes. Typically, such data is stored in a table,
and each record (row) corresponds to one individual. Each
record has a number of attributes, which can be divided into
the following three categories. (1) Attributes that clearly
identify individuals. These are known as explicit identiﬁers
and include Social Security Number, Address, and Name,
and so on. (2) Attributes whose values when taken together
can potentially identify an individual. These are known as
quasi-identiﬁers, and may include, e.g., Zip-code, Birth-
date, and Gender. (3) Attributes that are considered sen-
sitive, such as Disease and Salary.
When releasing microdata, it is necessary to prevent
the sensitive information of the individuals from being dis-
closed. Twotypesofinformationdisclosurehavebeeniden-
tiﬁed in the literature [4, 8]: identity disclosure and attribute
disclosure. Identity disclosure occurs when an individual is
linked to a particular record in the released table. Attribute
disclosure occurs when new information about some indi-
viduals is revealed, i.e., the released data makes it possible
to infer the characteristics of an individual more accurately
than it would be possible before the data release. Identity
disclosure often leads to attribute disclosure. Once there
is identity disclosure, an individual is re-identiﬁed and the
corresponding sensitive values are revealed. Attribute dis-
closure can occur with or without identity disclosure. It has
been recognized that even disclosure of false attribute in-
formation may cause harm [8]. An observer of a released
table may incorrectly perceive that an individual’s sensitive
attribute takes a particular value, and behave accordingly
based on the perception. This can harm the individual, even
if the perception is incorrect.
While the released table gives useful information to
researchers, it presents disclosure risk to the individuals
whose data are in the table. Therefore, our objective is to
limit the disclosure risk to an acceptable level while max-
imizing the beneﬁt. This is achieved by anonymizing the
data before release. The ﬁrst step of anonymization is to re-
move explicit identiﬁers. However, this is not enough, as an
adversary may already know the quasi-identiﬁer values of
some individuals in the table. This knowledge can be either
from personal knowledge (e.g., knowing a particular indi-
vidualinperson), orfromotherpublicly-availabledatabases
(e.g., a voter registration list) that include both explicit
identiﬁers and quasi-identiﬁers. A common anonymization
approach is generalization, which replaces quasi-identiﬁer
values with values that are less-speciﬁc but semantically
consistent. As a result, more records will have the same set
of quasi-identiﬁer values. We deﬁne an equivalence class
of an anonymized table to be a set of records that have the
same values for the quasi-identiﬁers.
To effectively limit disclosure, we need to measure the
disclosure risk of an anonymized table. To this end, Sama-
rati and Sweeney [14, 15, 17] introduced k-anonymity as
the property that each record is indistinguishable with at
1least k-1 other records with respect to the quasi-identiﬁer.
In other words, k-anonymity requires that each equivalence
class contains at least k records.
While k-anonymity protects against identity disclosure,
it is insufﬁcient to prevent attribute disclosure. To ad-
dress this limitation of k-anonymity, Machanavajjhala et
al. [11] recently introduced a new notion of privacy, called
`-diversity, which requires that the distribution of a sensi-
tive attribute in each equivalence class has at least ` “well-
represented” values.
One problem with l-diversity is that it is limited in its
assumption of adversarial knowledge. As we shall explain
below, it is possible for an adversary to gain information
about a sensitive attribute as long as she has information
about the global distribution of this attribute. This assump-
tion generalizes the speciﬁc background and homogeneity
attacks used to motivate `-diversity. Another problem with
privacy-preserving methods in general is that they effec-
tively assume all attributes to be categorical; the adversary
eitherdoesordoesnotlearnsomethingsensitive. Ofcourse,
especiallywithnumericalattributes, beingclosetothevalue
is often good enough.
Weproposeanovelprivacynotioncalledt-closenessthat
formalizes the idea of global background knowledge by re-
quiring that the distribution of a sensitive attribute in any
equivalence class is close to the distribution of the attribute
in the overall table (i.e., the distance between the two dis-
tributions should be no more than a threshold t). This ef-
fectively limits the amount of individual-speciﬁc informa-
tion an observer can learn. Further, in order to incorporate
distances between values of sensitive attributes, we use the
Earth Mover Distance metric [13] to measure the distance
between the two distributions. We discuss the rationale for
t-closeness and illustrate its advantages through examples
and experiments.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We give
an overview of `-diversity in Section 2 and discuss its limi-
tations in Section 3. We present the rationale and deﬁnition
of t-closeness in Section 4, and discuss how to calculate
the Earth Mover Distance in Section 5. Experimental re-
sults are presented in Section 6. Related work is discussed
in Section 7. In Section 8, we discuss limitations of our
approach and avenues for future research.
2. From k-Anonymity to `-Diversity
The protection k-anonymity provides is simple and easy
to understand. If a table satisﬁes k-anonymity for some
value k, then anyone who knows only the quasi-identiﬁer
values of one individual cannot identify the record corre-
sponding to that individual with conﬁdence grater than 1/k.
While k-anonymity protects against identity disclosure,
it does not provide sufﬁcient protection against attribute
ZIP Code Age Disease
1 47677 29 Heart Disease
2 47602 22 Heart Disease
3 47678 27 Heart Disease
4 47905 43 Flu
5 47909 52 Heart Disease
6 47906 47 Cancer
7 47605 30 Heart Disease
8 47673 36 Cancer
9 47607 32 Cancer
Table 1. Original Patients Table
ZIP Code Age Disease
1 476** 2* Heart Disease
2 476** 2* Heart Disease
3 476** 2* Heart Disease
4 4790* ≥ 40 Flu
5 4790* ≥ 40 Heart Disease
6 4790* ≥ 40 Cancer
7 476** 3* Heart Disease
8 476** 3* Cancer
9 476** 3* Cancer
Table 2. A 3-Anonymous Version of Table 1
disclosure. This has been recognized by several authors,
e.g., [11, 18, 20]. Two attacks were identiﬁed in [11]: the
homogeneity attack and the background knowledge attack.
Example 1 Table 1 is the original data table, and Table 2 is
an anonymized version of it satisfying 3-anonymity. The
Disease attribute is sensitive. Suppose Alice knows that
Bob is a 27-year old man living in ZIP 47678 and Bob’s
record is in the table. From Table 2, Alice can conclude that
Bob corresponds to one of the ﬁrst three records, and thus
must have heart disease. This is the homogeneity attack.
For an example of the background knowledge attack, sup-
pose that, by knowing Carl’s age and zip code, Alice can
conclude that Carl corresponds to a record in the last equiv-
alence class in Table 2. Furthermore, suppose that Alice
knows that Carl has very low risk for heart disease. This
background knowledge enables Alice to conclude that Carl
most likely has cancer.
To address these limitations of k-anonymity,
Machanavajjhala et al. [11] introduced `-diversity as a
stronger notion of privacy.
Deﬁnition 1 (The `-diversity Principle) An equivalence
class is said to have `-diversity if there are at least `
“well-represented” values for the sensitive attribute. A
table is said to have `-diversity if every equivalence class
of the table has `-diversity.
2Machanavajjhala et al. [11] gave a number of interpreta-
tions of the term “well-represented” in this principle:
1. Distinct `-diversity. The simplest understanding of
“well represented” would be to ensure there are at
least ` distinct values for the sensitive attribute in each
equivalence class. Distinct `-diversity does not prevent
probabilistic inference attacks. An equivalence class
may have one value appear much more frequently than
other values, enabling an adversary to conclude that an
entity in the equivalence class is very likely to have
that value. This motivated the development of the fol-
lowing two stronger notions of `-diversity.
2. Entropy `-diversity. The entropy of an equivalence
class E is deﬁned to be
Entropy(E) = −
X
s∈S
p(E,s)logp(E,s)
in which S is the domain of the sensitive attribute, and
p(E,s) is the fraction of records in E that have sensi-
tive value s.
A table is said to have entropy `-diversity if for every
equivalence class E, Entropy(E) ≥ log`. Entropy `-
diversity is strong than distinct `-diversity. As pointed
outin[11], inordertohaveentropy`-diversityforeach
equivalence class, the entropy of the entire table must
be at least log(`). Sometimes this may too restrictive,
as the entropy of the entire table may be low if a few
values are very common. This leads to the following
less conservative notion of `-diversity.
3. Recursive (c,`)-diversity. Recursive (c,`)-diversity
makes sure that the most frequent value does not ap-
pear too frequently, and the less frequent values do not
appear too rarely. Let m be the number of values in an
equivalence class, and ri,1 ≤ i ≤ m be the number of
times that the ith most frequent sensitive value appears
in an equivalence class E. Then E is said to have re-
cursive (c,`)-diversity if r1 < c(rl +rl+1 +...+rm).
A table is said to have recursive (c,`)-diversity if all of
its equivalence classes have recursive (c,`)-diversity.
3. Limitations of `-Diversity
While the `-diversity principle represents an important
step beyond k-anonymity in protecting against attribute dis-
closure, it has several shortcomings that we now discuss.
`-diversity may be difﬁcult and unnecessary to achieve.
Example 2 Supposethattheoriginaldatahasonlyonesen-
sitive attribute: the test result for a particular virus. It takes
two values: positive and negative. Further suppose that
there are 10000 records, with 99% of them being negative,
and only 1% being positive. Then the two values have very
different degrees of sensitivity. One would not mind be-
ing known to be tested negative, because then one is the
same as 99% of the population, but one would not want
to be known/considered to be tested positive. In this case,
2-diversity is unnecessary for an equivalence class that con-
tains only records that are negative. In order to have a dis-
tinct2-diversetable, therecanbeatmost10000×1% = 100
equivalenceclasses and the information loss wouldbe large.
Also observe that because the entropy of the sensitive at-
tribute in the overall table is very small, if one uses entropy
`-diversity, ` must be set to a small value.
`-diversity is insufﬁcient to prevent attribute disclosure.
Below we present two attacks on `-diversity.
Skewness Attack: When the overall distribution is
skewed, satisfying `-diversity does not prevent attribute dis-
closure. Consider again Example 2. Suppose that one
equivalence class has an equal number of positive records
andnegativerecords. It satisﬁes distinct2-diversity, entropy
2-diversity, and any recursive (c,2)-diversity requirement
that can be imposed. However, this presents a serious pri-
vacy risk, because anyone in the class would be considered
to have 50% possibility of being positive, as compared with
the 1% of the overall population.
Now consider an equivalence class that has 49 positive
records and only 1 negative record. It would be distinct 2-
diverse and has higher entropy than the overall table (and
thus satisﬁes any Entropy `-diversity that one can impose),
even though anyone in the equivalence class would be con-
sidered 98% positive, rather than 1% percent. In fact, this
equivalence class has exactly the same diversity as a class
that has 1 positive and 49 negative records, even though the
two classes present very differen levels of privacy risks.
Similarity Attack: When the sensitive attribute values in
an equivalence class are distinct but semantically similar,
an adversary can learn important information. Consider the
following example.
Example 3 Table 3 is the original table, and Table 4 shows
an anonymized version satisfying distinct and entropy 3-
diversity. There are two sensitive attributes: Salary and Dis-
ease. Suppose one knows that Bob’s record corresponds to
one of the ﬁrst three records, then one knows that Bob’s
salary is in the range [3K–5K] and can infer that Bob’s
salary is relatively low. This attack applies not only to
numeric attributes like “Salary”, but also to categorical at-
tributes like “Disease”. Knowing that Bob’s record belongs
to the ﬁrst equivalence class enables one to conclude that
Bob has some stomach-related problems, because all three
diseases in the class are stomach-related.
3ZIP Code Age Salary Disease
1 47677 29 3K gastric ulcer
2 47602 22 4K gastritis
3 47678 27 5K stomach cancer
4 47905 43 6K gastritis
5 47909 52 11K ﬂu
6 47906 47 8K bronchitis
7 47605 30 7K bronchitis
8 47673 36 9K pneumonia
9 47607 32 10K stomach cancer
Table 3. Original Salary/Disease Table
ZIP Code Age Salary Disease
1 476** 2* 3K gastric ulcer
2 476** 2* 4K gastritis
3 476** 2* 5K stomach cancer
4 4790* ≥ 40 6K gastritis
5 4790* ≥ 40 11K ﬂu
6 4790* ≥ 40 8K bronchitis
7 476** 3* 7K bronchitis
8 476** 3* 9K pneumonia
9 476** 3* 10K stomach cancer
Table 4. A 3-diverse version of Table 3
This leakage of sensitive information occurs because
while `-diversity requirement ensures “diversity” of sensi-
tive values in each group, it does not take into account the
semantical closeness of these values.
Summary In short, distributions that have the same level
of diversity may provide very different levels of privacy, be-
cause there are semantic relationships among the attribute
values, because different values have very different levels
of sensitivity, and because privacy is also affected by the
relationship with the overall distribution.
4. t-Closeness: A New Privacy Measure
Intuitively, privacy is measured by the information gain
of an observer. Before seeing the released table, the ob-
server has some prior belief about the sensitive attribute
value of an individual. After seeing the released table, the
observer has a posterior belief. Information gain can be rep-
resented as the difference between the posterior belief and
the prior belief. The novelty of our approach is that we
separate the information gain into two parts: that about the
whole population in the released data and that about speciﬁc
individuals.
To motivate our approach, let us perform the following
thought experiment: First an observer has some prior be-
lief B0 about an individual’s sensitive attribute. Then, in a
hypothetical step, the observer is given a completely gen-
eralized version of the data table where all attributes in a
quasi-identiﬁer are removed (or, equivalently, generalized
to the most general values). The observer’s belief is inﬂu-
enced by Q, the distribution of the sensitive attribute value
in the whole table, and changes to B1. Finally, the observer
is given the released table. By knowing the quasi-identiﬁer
values of the individual, the observer is able to identify the
equivalence class that the individual’s record is in, and learn
the distribution P of sensitive attribute values in this class.
The observer’s belief changes to B2.
The `-diversity requirement is motivated by limiting the
difference between B0 and B2 (although it does so only in-
directly, by requiring that P has a level of diversity). We
choose to limit the difference between B1 and B2. In other
words, we assume that Q, the distribution of the sensitive
attribute in the overall population in the table, is public in-
formation. We do not limit the observer’s information gain
about the population as a whole, but limit the extent to
which the observer can learn additional information about
speciﬁc individuals.
To justify our assumption that Q should be treated as
public information, we observe that with generalizations,
the most one can do is to generalize all quasi-identiﬁer at-
tributes to the most general value. Thus as long as a ver-
sion of the data is to be released, a distribution Q will be
released.1 We also argue that if one wants to release the
table at all, one intends to release the distribution Q and
this distribution is what makes data in this table useful. In
other words, one wants Q to be public information. A large
change from B0 to B1 means that the data table contains
a lot of new information, e.g., the new data table corrects
some widely held belief that was wrong. In some sense, the
larger the difference between B0 and B1 is, the more valu-
able the data is. Since the knowledge gain between B0 and
B1 is about the whole population, we do not limit this gain.
We limit the gain from B1 to B2 by limiting the distance
between P and Q. Intuitively, if P = Q, then B1 and B2
should be the same. If P and Q are close, then B1 and B2
should be close as well, even if B0 may be very different
from both B1 and B2.
Deﬁnition 2 (The t-closeness Principle:) An equivalence
class is said to have t-closeness if the distance between the
distribution of a sensitive attribute in this class and the dis-
tribution of the attribute in the whole table is no more than
a threshold t. A table is said to have t-closeness if all equiv-
alence classes have t-closeness.
1Note that even with suppression, a distribution will still be released.
This distribution may be slightly different from the distribution with no
record suppressed; however, from our point of view, we only need to con-
sider the released distribution and the distance of it from the ones in the
equivalence classes.
4Of course, requiring that P and Q to be close would also
limit the amount of useful information that is released, as
it limits information about the correlation between quasi-
identiﬁer attributes and sensitive attributes. However, this
is precisely what one needs to limit. If an observer gets too
clear a picture of this correlation, then attribute disclosure
occurs. The t parameter in t-closeness enables one to trade
off between utility and privacy.
Now the problem is to measure the distance between two
probabilistic distributions. There are a number of ways to
deﬁne the distance between them. Given two distributions
P = (p1,p2,...,pm),Q = (q1,q2,...,qm), twowell-known
distance measures are as follows. The variational distance
is deﬁned as:
D[P,Q] =
m X
i=1
1
2
|pi − qi|.
And the Kullback-Leibler (KL) distance [7] is deﬁned as:
D[P,Q] =
m X
i=1
pi log
pi
qi
= H(P) − H(P,Q)
where H(P) =
Pm
i=1 pi logpi is the entropy of P and
H(P,Q) =
Pm
i=1 pi logqi is the cross-entropy of P and
Q.
These distance measures do not reﬂect the semantic dis-
tance among values. Recall Example 3 (Tables 3 and 4),
wheretheoveralldistributionoftheIncomeattributeisQ =
{3k,4k,5k,6k,7k,8k,9k,10k,11k}.2 The ﬁrst equiva-
lence class in Table 4 has distribution P1 = {3k,4k,5k}
and the second equivalence class has distribution P2 =
{6k,8k,11k}. Our intuition is that P1 results in more in-
formation leakage than P2, because the values in P1 are all
in the lower end; thus we would like to have D[P1,Q] >
D[P2,Q]. The distance measures mentioned above would
not be able to do so, because from their point of view values
such as 3k and 6k are just different points and have no other
semantic meaning.
In short, we have a metric space for the attribute values
so that a ground distance is deﬁned between any pair of val-
ues. We then have two probability distributions over these
values and we want the distance between the two probabil-
ity distributions to be dependent upon the ground distances
among these values. This requirement leads us to the the
Earth Mover’s distance (EMD) [13], which is actually a
Monge-Kantorovich transportation distance [5] in disguise.
The EMD is based on the minimal amount of work
needed to transform one distribution to another by moving
distribution mass between each other. Intuitively, one dis-
tribution is seen as a mass of earth spread in the space and
2We use the notation {v1,v2,··· ,vm} to denote the uniform distri-
bution where each value in {v1,v2,··· ,vm} is equally likely.
the other as a collection of holes in the same space. EMD
measures the least amount of work needed to ﬁll the holes
with earth. A unit of work corresponds to moving a unit of
earth by a unit of ground distance.
EMD can be formally deﬁned using the well-studied
transportation problem. Let P = (p1,p2,...pm),Q =
(q1,q2,...qm), and dij be the ground distance between el-
ement i of P and element j of Q. We want to ﬁnd a ﬂow
F = [fij] where fij is the ﬂow of mass from element i of
P to element j of Q that minimizes the overall work:
WORK(P,Q,F) =
m X
i=1
m X
j=1
dijfij
subject to the following constraints:
fij ≥ 0 1 ≤ i ≤ m,1 ≤ j ≤ m (c1)
pi −
m X
j=1
fij +
m X
j=1
fji = qi 1 ≤ i ≤ m (c2)
m X
i=1
m X
j=1
fij =
m X
i=1
pi =
m X
i=1
qi = 1 (c3)
These three constraints guarantee that P is transformed
to Q by the mass ﬂow F. Once the transportation problem
is solved, the EMD is deﬁned to be the total work,3 i.e.,
D[P,Q] = WORK(P,Q,F) =
m X
i=1
m X
j=1
dijfij
We will discuss how to calculate the EMD between two
distributions in Section 5. We now observe two useful facts
about EMD.
Fact 1 If 0 ≤ dij ≤ 1 for all i,j, then 0 ≤ D[P,Q] ≤ 1.
The above fact follows directly from constraint (c1) and
(c3). It says that if the ground distances are normalized, i.e.,
all distances are between 0 and 1, then the EMD between
any two distributions is between 0 and 1. This gives a range
from which one can choose the t value for t-closeness.
Fact 2 Given two equivalence classes E1 and E2, let P1,
P2, and P be the distribution of a sensitive attribute in E1,
E2, and E1 ∪ E2, respectively. Then
D[P,Q] ≤
|E1|
|E1| + |E2|
D[P1,Q] +
|E2|
|E1| + |E2|
D[P2,Q]
3More generally, the EMD is the total work divided by the total ﬂow.
However, since we are calculating distance between two probability distri-
butions, the total ﬂow is always 1, as shown in formula (c3).
5It follows that D[P,Q] ≤ max(D[P1,Q],D[P2,Q]). This
means that when merging two equivalence classes, the max-
imumdistanceofanyequivalenceclassfromtheoveralldis-
tribution can never increase. Thus t-closeness is achievable
for any t ≥ 0.
The above fact entails that t-closeness with EMD satis-
ﬁes the following two properties.
Generalization Property Let T be a table, and let A
and B be two generalizations on T such that A is more
general than B If T satisﬁes t-closeness using B, then T
also satisﬁes t-closeness using A.
Proof Since each equivalence class in A is the union of
a set of equivalence classes in B and each equivalence class
in B satisﬁes t-closeness, we conclude that each equiva-
lence class in A also satisﬁes t-closeness. Thus T satisﬁes
t-closeness using A.
Subset Property Let T be a table and let C be a set of
attributes in T . If T satisﬁes t-closeness with respect to C,
then T also satisﬁes t-closeness with respect to any set of
attributes D such that D ⊂ C.
Proof Similarly, each equivalence class with respect to
D is the union of a set of equivalence classes with respect
to C and each equivalence class with respect to C satisﬁes
t-closeness, we conclude that each equivalence class with
respect to D also satisﬁes t-closeness. Thus T satisﬁes t-
closeness with respect to D.
The two properties guarantee that the t-closeness using
EMD measurement can be incorporated into the general
framework of the Incognito algorithm [9].
5. How to Calculate the EMD
To use t-closeness with EMD, we need to be able to cal-
culate the EMD between two distributions. One can cal-
culate EMD using solutions to the transportation problem,
such as a min-cost ﬂow[1]; however, these algorithms do
not provide an explicit formula. In the rest of this sec-
tion, wederiveformulasforcalculatingEMDforthespecial
cases that we need to consider.
5.1. EMD for Numerical Attributes
Numerical attribute values are ordered. Let the attribute
domain be {v1,v2...vm}, where vi is the ith smallest value.
Ordered Distance: The distance between two values of
is based on the number of values between them in the total
order, i.e., ordered dist(vi,vj) =
|i−j|
m−1.
It is straightforward to verify that the ordered-distance
measure is a metric. It is non-negative and satisﬁes the
symmetry property and the triangle inequality. To calcu-
late EMD under ordered distance, we only need to consider
ﬂows that transport distribution mass between adjacent el-
ements, because any transportation between two more dis-
tant elements can be equivalently decomposed into several
transportations between adjacent elements. Based on this
observation, minimal work can be achieved by satisfying
all elements of Q sequentially. We ﬁrst consider element
1, which has an extra amount of p1 − q1. Assume, without
loss of generality, that p1 − q1 < 0, an amount of q1 − p1
should be transported from other elements to element 1. We
can transport this from element 2. After this transportation,
element 1 is satisﬁed and element 2 has an extra amount of
(p1−q1)+(p2−q2). Similarly, we can satisfy element 2 by
transporting an amount of |(p1 − q1) + (p2 − q2)| between
element 2 and element 3. This process continues until ele-
ment m is satisﬁed and Q is reached.
Formally, let ri = pi − qi,(i=1,2,...,m), then the distance
between P and Q can be calculated as:
D[P,Q] =
1
m − 1
(|r1|+|r1+r2|+...+|r1+r2+...rm−1|)
=
1
m − 1
i=m X
i=1
¯
¯ ¯
¯
¯ ¯
j=i X
j=1
rj
¯
¯ ¯
¯
¯ ¯
5.2. EMD for Categorical Attributes
For categorical attributes, a total order often does not ex-
ist. We consider two distance measures.
Equal Distance: The ground distance between any two
value of a categorical attribute is deﬁned to be 1. It is easy
to verify that this is a metric. As the distance between any
two values is 1, for each point that pi − qi > 0, one just
needs to move the extra to some other points. Thus we have
the following formula:
D[P,Q] =
1
2
m X
i=1
|pi−qi| =
X
pi≥qi
(pi−qi) = −
X
pi<qi
(pi−qi)
Hierarchical Distance: The distance between two val-
ues of a categorical attribute is based on the minimum level
to which these two values are generalized to the same value
according to the domain hierarchy. Mathematically, let H
be the height of the domain hierarchy, the distance between
two values v1 and v2(which are leaves of the hierarchy) is
deﬁned to be level(v1,v2)/H, where level(v1,v2) is the
height of the lowest common ancestor node of v1 and v2.
It is straightforward to verify that this hierarchical-distance
measure is also a metric.
Given a domain hierarchy and two distributions P and
Q, we deﬁne the extra of a leaf node that corresponds to
element i, to be pi −qi, and the extra of an internal node N
to be the sum of extras of leaf nodes below N. This extra
function can be deﬁned recursively as:
extra(N) =
½
pi − qi if N is a leaf P
C∈Child(N) extra(C) otherwise
6where Child(N) is the set of all leaf nodes below node N.
The extra function has the property that the sum of extra
values for nodes at the same level is 0.
We further deﬁne two other functions for internal nodes:
pos extra(N) =
X
C∈Child(N)∧extra(C)>0
|extra(C)|
neg extra(N) =
X
C∈Child(N)∧extra(C)<0
|extra(C)|
We use cost(N) to denote the cost of movings be-
tween N’s children branches. An optimal ﬂow moves ex-
actly extra(N) in/out of the subtree rooted at N. Sup-
pose that pos extra(N) > neg extra, then extra(N) =
pos extra(N) − neg extra(N) and extra(N) needs to
move out. (This cost is counted in the cost of N’s parent
node.) In addition, one has to move neg extra among the
children nodes to even out all children branches; thus,
cost(N) =
height(N)
H
min(pos extra(N),neg extra(N))
Then the earth mover’s distance can be written as:
D[P,Q] =
P
N cost(N)
where N is a non-leaf node.
5.3 Analysis of t-Closeness with EMD
We now revisit Example 3 in Section 3, to show how t-
closeness with EMD handles the difﬁculties of `-diversity.
Recall that Q = {3k,4k,5k,6k,7k,8k,9k,10k,11k},
P1 = {3k,4k,5k}, and P2 = {6k,8k,11k}. We calculate
D[P1,Q] and D[P2,Q] using EMD. Let v1 = 3k,v2 =
4k,...v9 = 11k, we deﬁne the distance between vi and vj
to be |i − j|/8, thus the maximal distance is 1. We have
D[P1,Q] = 0.375,4 and D[P2,Q] = 0.167.
For the disease attribute, we use the hierarchy in Fig-
ure 1 to deﬁne the ground distances. For example, the dis-
tance between “Flu” and “Bronchitis” is 1/3, the distance
between “Flu”and “Pulmonary embolism” is 2/3, and the
distance between “Flu” and “Stomach cancer” is 3/3 = 1.
Then the distance between the distribution {gastric ulcer,
gastritis, stomach cancer} and the overall distribution is 0.5
while the distance between the distribution {gastric ulcer,
stomach cancer, pneumonia} is 0.278.
Table 5 shows another anonymized version of Table 3. It
has 0.167-closeness w.r.t Salary and 0.278-closeness w.r.t.
Disease. The Similarity Attack is prevented in Table 5. For
4One optimal mass ﬂow that transforms P1 to Q is to move 1/9 prob-
ability mass across the following pairs: (5k→11k), (5k→10k), (5k→9k),
(4k→8k), (4k→7k), (4k→6k), (3k→5k), (3k→4k). The cost of this is
1/9 × (6 + 5 + 4 + 4 + 3 + 2 + 2 + 1)/8 = 27/72 = 3/8 = 0.375.
ZIP Code Age Salary Disease
1 4767* ≤ 40 3K gastric ulcer
3 4767* ≤ 40 5K stomach cancer
8 4767* ≤ 40 9K pneumonia
4 4790* ≥ 40 6K gastritis
5 4790* ≥ 40 11K ﬂu
6 4790* ≥ 40 8K bronchitis
2 4760* ≤ 40 4K gastritis
7 4760* ≤ 40 7K bronchitis
9 4760* ≤ 40 10K stomach cancer
Table 5. Table that has 0.167-closeness w.r.t.
Salary and 0.278-closeness w.r.t. Disease
example, Alice cannot infer that Bob has a low salary or
Bob has stomach-related diseases based on Table 5.
We note that t-closeness protects against attribute disclo-
sure, butdoesnotdealwithidentitydisclosure. Thus, itmay
be desirable to use both t-closeness and k-anonymity at the
same time. Further, it should be noted that t-closeness deals
with the homogeneity and background knowledge attacks
on k-anonymity not by guaranteeing that they can never oc-
cur, but by guaranteeing that if such attacks can occur, then
similar attacks can occur even with a fully-generalized ta-
ble. As we argued earlier, this is the best one can achieve if
one is to release the data at all.
6. Experiments
The main goals of the experiments are to study the effect
of Similarity Attack on real data and to investigate the per-
formance implications of the t-closeness approach in terms
of efﬁciency and data quality.
The dataset used in the experiments is the adult dataset
from the UC Irvine machine learning repository, which is
comprised of data collected from the US census. We used
nine attributes of the dataset, as shown in Figure 2. Records
with missing values are eliminated and there are 30162
valid records in total. We use our Java implementation of
the Incognito [9] algorithm. The experiments are run on a
3.4GHZ Pentium 4 machine with 2GB memory.
Similarity Attack We use the ﬁrst 7 attributes as the quasi-
identiﬁer and treat Occupation as the sensitive attribute. We
divide the 14 values of the Occupation attribute into three
roughly equal-size groups, based on the semantic closeness
of the values. Any equivalence class that has all values
falling in one group is viewed as vulnerable to the similarity
attack. We use Incognito to generate all entropy 2-diversity
tables. In total, there are 21 minimal tables and 13 of them
suffersfromtheSimilarityattack. Inonetable, atotalof916
records can be inferred about their sensitive value class. We
7Figure 1. Hierarchy for categorical attributes Disease.
Attribute Type # of values Height
1 Age Numeric 74 5
2 Workclass Categorical 8 3
3 Education Categorical 16 4
4 Country Categorical 41 3
5 Marital Status Categorical 7 3
6 Race Categorical 5 3
7 Gender Categorical 2 2
8 Occupation Sensitive 14 3
9 Salary Sensitive 2 2
Figure 2. Description of the Adult dataset
used in the experiment
also generate all 26 minimal recursive (4,4)-diversity ta-
bles, and found that 17 of which are vulnerable to the simi-
larity attack.
Efﬁciency We compare the efﬁciency and data quality
of ﬁve privacy measures: (1) k-anonymity; (2) entropy
`-diversity; (3) recursive (c,`) diversity; (4) k-anonymity
with t-closeness(t = 0.2); and (5) k-anonymity with t-
closeness(t = 0.15).
Results of efﬁciency experiments are shown in Figure 3.
Again we use the Occupation attribute as the sensitive at-
tribute. Figure 3(a) shows the running times with ﬁxed
k = 5,` = 5 and varied quasi-identiﬁer size s, where
2 ≤ s ≤ 7. A quasi-identiﬁer of size s consists of the
ﬁrst s attributes listed in Table 2. Figure 3(b) shows the
running times of the ﬁve privacy measures with the same
quasi-identiﬁer but with different parameters for k and `.
As shown in the ﬁgures, entropy `-diversity run faster than
the other four measures; the difference gets larger when `
increases. This is because with large `, entropy `-diversity
prunes the search lattice earlier.
Data Quality Our third set of experiments compare the
data quality of the ﬁve privacy measures using the discerni-
bility metric [2] and Minimal Average Group Size [9, 14].
The ﬁrst metric measures the number of records that are
indistinguishable from each other. Each record in an equiv-
alence class of size t gets a penalty of t while each sup-
pressed tuple gets a penalty equal to the total number of
records. The second metric is the average size of the equiv-
alence classes generated by the anonymization algorithm.
We use the 7 regular attributes as the quasi-identiﬁer and
Occupation as the sensitive attribute. We set different pa-
rameters for k, `, and compare the resulted dataset pro-
duced by different measurements. Figure 4 summarizes
the results. We found that entropy `-diversity tables has
worse data quality than the other measurements. We also
found that the data quality of k-anonymous tables without t-
closeness is slightly better than k-anonymous tables with t-
closeness. This is because t-closeness requirement provides
extra protection to sensitive values and the cost is decreased
data quality. When choosing t = 0.2, the degradation in
data quality is minimal.
7. Related Work
The problem of information disclosure has been stud-
ied extensively in the framework of statistical databases. A
number of information disclosure limitation techniques [3]
have been designed for data publishing, including Sam-
pling, Cell Suppression, Rounding, and Data Swapping and
Perturbation. These techniques, however, compromised
data integrity of the tables. Samarati and Sweeney [14, 15,
17] introduced the k-anonymity approach and used gener-
alization and suppression techniques to preserve informa-
tion truthfulness. Numerous algorithms [2, 6, 10, 9, 15, 16]
have been proposed to achieve k-anonymity requirement.
Optimal k-anonymity has been proved to be NP-hard for
k ≥ 3 [12].
Recently, a number of authors have recognized that k-
anonymity does not prevent attribute disclosure, e.g., [11,
18, 20]. Machanavajjhala et al. [11] proposed `-diversity.
As we discuss in detail in Section 3, while `-diversity is
an important step beyond k-anonymity, it has a number of
limitations. Xiao and Tao [20] observe that `-diversity can-
8(a) Varied QI size for k = 5, l = 5 (b) Varied parameters k and l
Figure 3. Efﬁciency of the Five Privacy Measures.
(a) Discernibility metric cost (b) Minimal average group size
Figure 4. Data Quality of the Five Measures.
not prevent attribute disclosure, when multiple records in
the table corresponds to one individual. They proposed to
have each individual specify privacy policies about his or
her own attributes. We identify limitations of `-diversity
even when each record corresponds to one individual and
proposes t-closeness, an alternative privacy measure with-
out the need for individual policies. Xiao and Tao [19]
proposed Anatomy, an data anonymization approach that
divides one table into two for release; one table includes
original quasi-identiﬁer and a group id, and the other in-
clude the association between the group id and the sensitive
attribute values. Anatomy uses `-diversity as the privacy
measure; we believe that t-closeness can be used to provide
more meaningful privacy.
In these proceedings, Zhang et al.[21] examine the
anonymization problem from the perspective of answer-
ing downstream aggregate queries. They develop a new
privacy-preserving framework based not on generalization,
but on permutations. Their work, like ours, addresses
the problem of dealing with attributes deﬁned on a metric
space; their approach is to lower bound the range of values
of a sensitive attribute in a group.
8. Conclusions and Future Work
While k-anonymity protects against identity disclosure,
it does not provide sufﬁcient protection against attribute dis-
closure. The notion of `-diversity attempts to solve this
problem by requiring that each equivalence class has at least
` well-represented values for each sensitive attribute. We
have shown that `-diversity has a number of limitations and
have proposed a novel privacy notion called t-closeness,
which requires that the distribution of a sensitive attribute
in any equivalence class is close to the distribution of the
attribute in the overall table (i.e., the distance between the
twodistributionsshouldbenomorethanathresholdt). One
key novelty of our approach is that we separate the infor-
mation gain an observer can get from a released data ta-
ble into two parts: that about all population in the released
data and that about speciﬁc individuals. This enables us to
limit only the second kind of information gain. We use the
Earth Mover Distance measure for our t-closeness require-
ment; this has the advantage of taking into consideration the
semantic closeness of attribute values. Below we discuss
some interesting open research issues.
Multiple Sensitive Attributes Multiple sensitive attributes
9present additional challenges. Suppose we have two sensi-
tive attributes U and V . One can consider the two attributes
separately, i.e., an equivalence class E has t-closeness if
E has t-closeness with respect to both U and V . Another
approach is to consider the joint distribution of the two at-
tributes. To use this approach, one has to choose the ground
distance between pairs of sensitive attribute values. A sim-
ple formula for calculating EMD may be difﬁcult to derive,
and the relationship between t and the level of privacy be-
comes more complicated.
Other Anonymization Techniques t-closeness allows
us to take advantage of anonymization techniques other
than generalization of quasi-identiﬁer and suppression of
records. For example, instead of suppressing a whole
record, one can hide some sensitive attributes of the
record; one advantage is that the number of records in the
anonymized table is accurate, which may be useful in some
applications. Because this technique does not affect quasi-
identiﬁers, it does not help achieve k-anonymity and hence
has not been considered before. Removing a value only
decreases diversity; therefore, it does not help to achieve
`-diversity. However, in t-closeness, removing an outlier
may smooth a distribution and bring it closer to the over-
all distribution. Another possible technique is to generalize
a sensitive attribute value, rather than hiding it completely.
An interesting question is how to effectively combine these
techniques with generalization and suppression to achieve
better data quality.
Limitations of using EMD in t-closeness The t-closeness
principle can be applied using other distance measures.
While EMD is the best measure we have found so far, it
is certainly not perfect. In particular, the relationship be-
tween the value t and information gain is unclear. For ex-
ample, the EMD between the two distributions (0.01,0.99)
and (0.11,0.89) is 0.1, and the EMD between (0.4,0.6)
and (0.5,0.5) is also 0.1. However, one may argue that the
change between the ﬁrst pair is much more signiﬁcant than
that between the second pair. In the ﬁrst pair, the probabil-
ity of taking the ﬁrst value increases from 0.01 to 0.11, a
1000% increase. While in the second pair, the probability
increase is only 25%. In general, what we need is a mea-
sure that combines the distance-estimation properties of the
EMD with the probability scaling nature of the KL distance.
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